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Abstract
Background: During the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, one of the key components of 
many countries’ strategies to reduce the spread of the virus is contact tracing.
Objective: To explore public attitudes to a COVID-19 contact tracing app in the 
United Kingdom.
Setting: Online video-conferencing.
Participants: 27 participants, UK residents aged 18 years and older.
Methods: Qualitative study consisting of six focus groups carried out between 1st-
12th May, 2020 (39-50 days into the UK ‘lockdown’).
Results: Participants were divided as to whether or not they felt they would use 
the app. Analysis revealed five themes: (1) lack of information and misconceptions 
surrounding COVID-19 contact tracing apps; (2) concerns over privacy; (3) concerns 
over stigma; (4)concerns over uptake; and (5) contact tracing as the ‘greater good’. 
Concerns over privacy, uptake and stigma were particularly significant amongst those 
stated they will not be using the app, and the view that the app is for the ‘greater 
good’ was particularly significant amongst those who stated they will be using the 
app. One of the most common misconceptions about the app was that it could allow 
users to specifically identify and map COVID-19 cases amongst their contacts and in 
their vicinity.
Conclusions: Our participants were torn over whether digital contact tracing is a 
good idea or not, and views were heavily influenced by moral reasoning.
Patient or Public Contribution: No patients were involved in this study. The public 
were not involved in the development of the research questions, research design or 
outcome measures. A pilot focus group with participants not included in the present 
paper was used to help test and refine the focus group questions. Summary results 
were disseminated via email to participants prior to publication for feedback and 
comment.
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1  | BACKGROUND
As of September 16, 2020, COVID-19 accounted for approximately 
one million deaths globally, approximately 40,000 of which were in 
the UK, with total numbers of cases and deaths increasing daily.1 
The novelty of the SARS-CoV-2 virus means that, at present, no vac-
cines or antiviral drugs are available. In the absence of biomedical 
interventions to reduce morbidity and mortality from COVID-19, 
non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as physical distancing, hand 
hygiene and restricted movement, have been proposed, including 
the ‘lockdown’ policy of only leaving the home when essential (im-
plemented in the UK on March 23, 2020).2 Although highly effective 
as a means to significantly slow the transmission of the virus (that is, 
to lower its reproductive (R0) value) in the population, lockdown is a 
strict strategy that is having number of significant adverse impacts, 
including wider economic impacts for society and social and psycho-
logical impacts for individuals.3,4 As such, stringent lockdowns are 
necessarily a temporary and relatively short-term measure.
One of the key components of many countries’ post-lockdown 
strategies is the use of contact tracing. Contact tracing is where 
those in close contact with individuals, who report symptoms indic-
ative of an infectious disease and/or test positive for the disease, 
are identified and given appropriate medical instruction. It has suc-
cessfully been used to control the spread of other novel communi-
cable diseases, such as Ebola.5 Traditionally, contact tracing relies 
on a team of health workers to track possible transmissions man-
ually, through interviews with those who test positive for an infec-
tious disease, in order to work out with whom they have recently 
been in close contact. Contacts deemed at risk are then informed of 
the fact they have been exposed and are then advised (or in some 
countries required) to self-isolate. Several countries, most notably 
South Korea and Singapore, have successfully used contact tracing 
(primarily using manual tracing) methods at an early stage in the out-
break in order to dramatically slow the spread of, and reduce the 
total number of cases and deaths from, COVID-19.6 However, while 
manual contact tracing has proven successful at early stages in the 
outbreak, where total number of cases are very low, it has been ar-
gued that doing so at a later stage, when total numbers of infections 
are much higher, is problematic.7 Firstly, manual contact tracing on 
a large scale is highly resource-intensive. For instance, in the UK an 
initial 18-25 000 contact tracers were employed during May 2020.8 
Secondly, it has been argued that due to the speed at which COVID-
19 spreads, manual contact tracing might be too slow to be effective 
on its own.9 As such, digital contact tracing has been proposed and 
is being explored in a number of countries, including the UK, as a 
supplement to manual contact tracing.10
The UK’s path to providing a contact tracing app has been con-
troversial and subject to much discussion and critique in the UK 
media.11 Essentially, contact tracing apps work by keeping a record 
of other smartphones they have been in close proximity with, via the 
phones’ built-in Bluetooth signals that are anonymously swapped via 
a ‘digital handshake’. Initially, the UK government proposed a ‘cen-
tralized model’, where contact data are stored in a cental database 
and not exclusively on the phones themselves. On 12th April, the UK 
government announced the new centralized NHSX (the technology 
arm of the UK’s National health Service) contact tracing app, a pilot 
trial of which was launched on the Isle of Wight (a small island with a 
population of approximately 140 000) on 4th May.12 The centralized 
approach contrasted with the version developed by the major tech-
nology companies Apple and Google (a ‘decentralized approach’), 
where contact information is only stored on the phones’ handsets, a 
model being used in a number of other countries like Germany and 
Switzerland.12 On the 18th June, the UK government abandoned its 
app, in favour of the decentralized model, after releasing details of 
a number of problems identified in the pilot, including the fact that 
when used on Apple iPhones, only around 4% of contacts were suc-
cessfully identified.13 The new, decentralized app was later officially 
released on September 24, 2020. As discussed below, focus groups 
for this study were conducted between 1st-12th May 2020, prior to 
the app's eventual release, and at a time when the UK was proposing 
its NHSX centralized app would be used.
Modelling evidence suggests that in order for digital contact 
tracing to be effective, use of contact tracing apps would need to be 
very high, with 80% of smartphone users (equivalent to 56% of the 
UK population) needing to use the app in order to completely stop 
the pandemic spreading, although lower rates of use could still have 
beneficial impacts.9 Although much has been written about contact 
tracing apps in the media, academic research is only just beginning 
to explore public attitudes towards COVID-19 policy, including con-
tact tracing strategies and technologies, and much of it so far has 
taken the form of public opinion surveys.14,15 Some surveys have 
suggested that a majority of smartphone users would use the app,16 
but emerging evidence from early-adopting countries like Singapore 
suggests that actual uptake might be considerably lower.17 There is, 
to our knowledge, as yet no published qualitative research on public 
attitudes towards COVID-19 contact tracing apps. Qualitative re-
search can provide an important supplement to large sample opinion 
polls involving an in-depth exploration of the reasons and motiva-
tions behind individuals’ intentions towards use of contact tracing 
apps. If the UK’s contact tracing strategy is to be effective, govern-
ment and health authorities will need to understand and respond 
quickly to any public concerns over the app. The aim of this paper 
is to explore attitudes towards digital contact tracing in a sample of 
the UK public. Specifically, we seek to explore people's knowledge 
of digital contact tracing, their views on contact tracing apps (spe-
cifically the extent to which they are favourable to them or not), and 
ultimately whether or not they planned to use a contact tracing app 
when one became available in the UK. These findings can feed into 
K E Y W O R D S
contact tracing, COVID-19, public attitudes, public health
     |  3WILLIAMS et AL.
debates around how best to communicate to the public the potential 
role of digital contact tracing as a contributing intervention through 
which to reduce the future spread of COVID-19.
2  | METHODS
We conducted six online focus groups with 27UK-based participants 
between 1st and 12th May 2020 during the UK’s COVID-19 lock-
down (39-50 days after the official start of the UK lockdown).For 
context, as described above, at the time of data collection, the UK 
government had proposed a centralized approach using a NHSX-
developed app, due to be trialled from 4th May 2020. Participants 
were adults aged 18 years or over currently residing in the UK. All 
focus groups were conducted using the online conference platform 
Zoom. Online focus groups do have methodological benefits par-
ticularly as a cost-effective method of eliciting public views from a 
geographically dispersed group of participants.18,19
Focus groups were conducted as part of a larger, mixed-methods 
longitudinal study tracking public attitudes to COVID-19 and its as-
sociated policies in the UK, as well as the social and psychological im-
pacts of such policies. Full ethical approval was granted by Swansea 
University's School of Management Research Ethics Committee. 
Focus group recruitment took place online through a combination of 
social media snowball sampling, online community and volunteer ad-
vertising sites and social media advertisements. For example, adver-
tisements were placed in local community groups on social media (eg 
Facebook) and other community advertising sites (eg Gumtree), but 
did not target specific interest groups or inclusion criteria, other than 
focusing on local or regional interests. We did however take a purpo-
sive approach to sampling, attempting to include a range of ages, gen-
ders, racial/ethnic identities and occupational backgrounds (Table 1).
Most participants were recruited from social media snowball 
sampling and online community and volunteer advertising sites, 
which likely accounts for the high number of participants in the 
18-49 age range and the lack of participants aged 50 and over (due 
to the fact the sites are more commonly used amongst younger age 
groups). Although participants were aware all research was online, 
adverts were placed in relevant community groups on social media 
and volunteering sites in a variety of countries, regions and cities 
across the UK, so as to recruit participants from across the UK The 
final sample included participants from all four UK countries (in 
order to protect confidentiality specific locations of participants 
are not provided). Paid-for social media (Facebook) advertisements 
were taken out to specifically target potential participant aged 50 
and over, but these failed to generate any sustained interest from 
potential participants.
Focus groups met for approximately one hour each. Most partic-
ipants joined Zoom using both video and audio, although some were 
given the option, and preferred, to join with audio only. All focus 
groups were organized and moderated by SW (a medical social sci-
entist). The topic guide for the focus groups was initially developed 
by the research team in virtual group meetings. Although the focus 
groups discussed topics related to the broader research project (eg 
experiences on social distancing, views on COVID-19 testing and 
vaccinations), it also specifically included questions seeking to elicit 
participants views on COVID-19 contact tracing apps (eg ‘do you 
think you will use the planned COVID-19 app?’ and ‘what are your 
views on the planned COVID-19 contact tracing app?’
2.1 | Analysis
Data were analysed in accordance with a thematic approach20,21 This 
is an iterative and abductive analytical process through which emer-
gent themes from early focus groups were used to add to or refine 
questions and prompts during subsequent groups. Data were tran-
scribed for coding, with all participant information being anonymized 
to protect confidentiality. SW and KD analysed the transcripts and 
developed and applied the thematic coding framework, moving from 
open through to more focused coding.20,21 Themes were discussed 
and developed with CA and TT during virtual research group meet-
ings. Negative case analysis was used to seek for information that 
did not fit emergent themes, and where this occurred, themes were 
modified accordingly.22 Data collection and analysis continued until 
theoretical saturation was reached.21 Data were analysed in NVivo 
(version 11.4.3, QRS).
Ethical restrictions related to participant confidentiality prohibit 
the authors from making the data set publicly available. During the 
consent process, participants were explicitly guaranteed that the 
data would only be seen my members of the study team. For any dis-
cussions about the data set please contact the corresponding author 
(s.n.williams@swansea.ac.uk).
3  | RESULTS
Participants were split regarding whether or not they felt they would 
use a contact tracing app. While some stated they would be using 












Other ethnicity 11 (41)
Undisclosed 3 (11)
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the app, others argued the would not, and still others were unsure 
or undecided as to whether they were going to use it or not. No pat-
terns emerged according to the demographics of the participants in 
terms of whether they felt they would use a contact tracing app or 
not.
Analysis revealed five main themes: (a) lack of information and 
misconceptions surrounding COVID-19 contact tracing apps; (b) 
concerns over privacy; (c) concerns over stigma; (d) concerns over 
uptake; and (e) contact tracing as the ‘greater good’. These themes 
were found across the sample and the three groups; however, cer-
tain themes were more salient, and appeared to carry more weight 
in influencing their views as to whether they would use the app 
or not, in some groups compared to others. Many participants 
across all three groups either expressed a lack of knowledge of, or 
displayed misconceptions about, COVID-19 contact tracing apps. 
Concerns over privacy and uptake were expressed across all three 
groups, but seemed to be particularly significant for those who said 
they would not use the app. Concerns over stigma were expressed 
by participants in the ‘would not use app’ and ‘undecided’ groups, 
but not in the ‘would use’ group. The view that contact tracing was 
for ‘the greater good’ was expressed by participants in the ‘would 
use’ and ‘undecided’ groups, but not in the ‘would not use’ group, 
and was particularly significant for those in the ‘would use’ group.
3.1 | Lack of information and misconceptions 
surrounding COVID-19 contact tracing apps
Many participants either expressed a lack of knowledge of contact 
tracing and contact tracing apps or appeared to have misconcep-
tions over what the official UK government-proposed app entails. 
Amongst those who had not heard of contact tracing apps, one 
of the reasons was because they had ‘not been watching the news’ 
(Participant 19, female, 20s), as they were ‘sick and tired of hearing 
more of coronavirus’ (Participant 20, female, 20s). Amongst those 
who had heard of them, one of the biggest misconception was that 
the app would entail some form of ‘mapping’ that would be visible to 
other smartphone users or the public in general:
I think they wanted to develop an app or something, 
so you would know how many Covid cases are in your 
area, so you know where not to go. So, if everyone got 
sent a test and managed in certain areas not go out 
until everyone has been tested, so you know where 
the virus is so you know who can leave their homes 
and who can’t 
(Participant 6, male, 20s)
3.2 | Concerns over privacy
The most commonly stated concern was over data privacy and secu-
rity. Participants expressed a reluctance to have their data accessed 
by government or health authorities. Participants associated con-
tact tracing with increased surveillance by government and were 
concerned by what they perceived as ‘submitting’ their personal 
information:
Contact tracing seems quite Big Brotherly. I don’t 
think I am willing to submit all my data and all of my 
contacts for the government to scrutinise who I see 
regularly. I don’t think I will be willing to join the con-
tact tracing apps 
(Participant 16, female, 30s)
Participants were also concerned that their data would be accessi-
ble to others outside of government and health authorities, including 
‘third parties’ or ‘hackers’:
You don’t know who is running these apps, you don’t 
want third party accessing your information. This 
is the worrying thing about modern technology; 
you do not know who is accessing your health and 
things. 
(Participant 10, male, 40s)
Hackers could pose as health experts or something, 
there are so many scams that are going on. Scammers 
are supposedly selling. I am not in favour of this app 
personally. 
(Participant 7, male, 20s)
However, some of these concerns over privacy seemed to stem 
from the misunderstanding discussed in the previous section that app 
users would be able to identify specific COVID-19 cases amongst their 
contacts or their vicinity:
Imagine walking around, and thinking “you’ve got it, 
you’ve got it” and you have got it [phone] in your hand 
… Imagine you were like, “oh I’ll go see my friends 
when we are all allowed,” and they were like “You 
have got corona it says it on my app” 
(Participant 19, female, 20s)
For those who stated they will not use the app, privacy was the 
most common reason stated for their decision. They were generally 
opposed to anyone, including government and health officials ac-
cessing their data under any circumstance. For those who said they 
would download the app, privacy concerns were mentioned, but 
were seen to be outweighed by the perceived benefits of the app 
for public health (as discussed below). Those who were undecided 
tended to argue that they would use the app provided they were 
sure that their data were not visible to other smartphone users or 
the general public they were given assurances over privacy and data 
protection:
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I would get it if there were no privacy concerns and 
it was just for the government to track the spread of 
the virus … but I wouldn’t do it if there was a map 
to see. 
(Participant 18, female, 20s)
Those who were undecided also tended to weigh up their concerns 
over data privacy with their view that apps which require the disclo-
sure of personal information are already commonplace:
I’m a bit wary with the app but I tend to download 
anything and sign my life away all the time … I think I 
would be alright with that kind of stuff …. I think ev-
eryone is already traced and they don’t even know. 
(Participant 16, female, 30s)
What do I have to hide? Nothing. Big Brother can 
watch me I really don’t worry about these things. 
But you never worry about it until something weird 
comes up and companies start trying to buy the data 
and do bad things with it. It’s all about ethics at that 
point. 
(Participant 26, Male 30s)
3.3 | Concerns over stigma
Another commonly expressed concern was over the stigmatizing po-
tential of the app. This concern was related to concerns over a lack 
of privacy and specifically the misconception that the app would en-
able people to use the app to identify others that have or have had 
COVID-19:
I actually think that [the contact tracing app] is a terri-
fying concept… it’s like being branded with a. horren-
dous black mark. … I could look and be like my friend, 
my neighbour has got Covid. 
(Participant 17, male, 20s)
These participants feared that being able to identify others with 
COVID-19 would lead to discrimination:
It could cause hate crime as well. Finding out “oh 
you know I got it from this person,” and finding out 
your neighbours have it, and “oh I will stay away from 
them.” 
(Participant 9, female, 30s)
It is just asking for more isolation and hysteria. … It 
would be like Snap Maps: “oh I want to go to Tesco, 
but oh no she’s there and she has got Covid”…. I 
think that would make me not want to get tested [for 
covid-19]. I wouldn’t want to be on the “Snapmap of 
Shame.” Like, if you could see all these people that 
you know have corona, that could lead to bullying in 
some cases. 
(Participant 19, female, 20s)
3.4 | Concerns over uptake
Another commonly voiced concern was over uptake of the app. A 
number of participants questioned whether enough people would 
use it in order for it to be an effective means of reducing the spread 
of the virus:
We have only reduced or flattened the curve because 
we have all collectively socially distanced … and if 
people were to download the app I think it would have 
to be done in a large group of people if not everybody 
for it to be effective … I don’t know how effective it 
would be in terms of transmission rates. I wouldn’t 
rush to download it. 
(Participant 17, male, 20s)
Amongst those who had heard of contact tracing, some drew 
comparisons between the UK and countries who had experienced 
the pandemic earlier and who had already made, in their view, ef-
fective use of contact tracing, such as Singapore. However, these 
participants tended to argue that the high level of adherence and 
enforcement in such countries would not be achievable in the UK 
which was perceived as less accepting of state interventionism and 
less collectivist:
The issue here is will society take it on board and 
actually do it. I think one of the reasons why places 
like China, South Korea, Singapore, those Asian 
countries can successfully manage those situations 
is because they have a relatively compliant society, 
people tend to work together or maybe it’s just be-
cause they are used to having their civil liberties 
curbed to a degree 
(Participant 12, male, 40s)
Another consideration was that a proportion of the population did 
not have smartphones, for example the homeless, elderly or socially 
or economically vulnerable in society. For some, such inequalities in 
access to the technology would reduce the effectiveness of using an 
app as part of a contact tracing strategy:
Some people don’t know how to download an app, some 
people don’t have a smartphone, some people may be 
left out, the vulnerable, and if they aren’t able to put in 
the data this might have an effect on other people. So 
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how accurate and how up to date and how reliable the 
information could be would make a difference 
(Participant 1, male, 30s)
Amongst those who were undecided, there was a feeling that so-
cial norms or ‘pressure’ would lead them to overcome their reserva-
tions and use the app:
I’m torn. But if it gets to that point that its widely ad-
opted, I probably would [use it]. Id cave to the pres-
sure of like, “well everyone else is doing it.” But right 
now I feel very uncertain about it. 
(Participant 23, female 40s)
3.5 | Contact tracing as ‘the greater good’
No participants were unequivocally positive about the contact trac-
ing app. Ultimately, what distinguished those who were intended to 
use the app from those who did not intend on using it was their belief 
that it was the ‘right thing’ to do because it would be beneficial for 
the wider public health, and that this potential benefit outweighed 
their concerns:
If it is going to be for the greater good, I would do it, 
but it doesn’t fill me with joy. 
(Participant 17, male, 20s)
I would do it if it helps but it’s not something I want 
to do. 
(Participant 8, female, 40s)
In particular, the recognition of the severity and urgency of the 
pandemic was seen as a reason as a reason to use the app:
I would really support it, I know privacy is really im-
portant … anything that would help, it doesn’t make 
sense why people wouldn’t participate; people are 
dying all over the world, what’s more important at 
the moment, to try and stop this or people knowing 
what’s happened on your phone 
(Participant 16, female, 30s)
These participants implied that, because contact tracing in their 
view was necessary for slowing the spread of the virus, they had little 
agency over whether or not to use the app. Contact tracing was here 
characterized as a necessary evil (the ‘only way out’) or as an obligation 
(‘civic duty’):
The idea of tracking, with a Big Brother or something, 
I am totally opposed to it normally, but I can’t tell you 
how totally opposed normally. But based on what 
countries that have been successful have done, I feel 
like this might be the only way out of this. 
(Participant 21, female, 50s)
I don’t know, part of me thinks it is Big Brother, and I 
want to opt out completely, but part of me thinks it is 
my civic duty. I’m very, very torn. 
(Participant 27, Male 30s)
4  | DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest five interrelated factors which shaped our 
participants’ perceptions of COVID-19 contact tracing apps in the 
UK; concerns over uptake, stigma and privacy; a lack of informa-
tion or misinformation about the nature and function of the app; 
and the perception of contact tracing as the ‘greater good’. Overall, 
our group of participants were torn as to whether they felt contact 
tracing apps were useful as a public health intervention and as to 
whether they would use them or not. Ultimately, the latter rests on 
the former, since if enough people feel that a contact tracing app is 
not going to effective because too few others are not going to use it 
(and use this as a reason to not use it themselves) then their beliefs 
may contribute to a self-fulfilling prophesy at the population level. 
Concerns over uptake were framed in terms of social inequalities and 
cultural norms around state interventionism. It was argued that be-
cause certain social groups do not have access to smartphones, and 
because the UK public would not be willing to accept contact tracing 
in general as a strategy, it would not be as effective as it had been 
in countries like Singapore or South Korea. Participants suggested 
that social ‘pressure’ might lead them to use the app, suggesting that 
uptake is tied to social norms around the potential popularity and 
thus effectiveness of the app. In turn, social norms over the popular-
ity and eventual uptake of the app are interrelated with additional 
concerns over privacy and stigma, as well as to perceptions of social 
obligation (‘civic duty’).Concerns over privacy were often framed in 
terms of a general lack of trust or faith in government and its han-
dling of the pandemic thus far, and their opposition to what was per-
ceived as an unnecessary form of government control and the role of 
technology in the rise of a surveillance society.23-25
A major theme was the perceived lack of knowledge and the 
existence of misconceptions around the app. One of the common 
misconceptions was that the app would provide identifiable infor-
mation, and users themselves would be able to specifically identify 
others with COVID-19 (or be identified themselves). These con-
cerns were expressed by participants across all three groups, but, 
as discussed below, were more salient in some groups over others, 
in relation to influencing their view on whether they will likely use 
the app or not. Concerns over stigma stemmed from a fundamental 
misconception that the app could enable its users to identify COVID-
19 cases amongst their contacts or even synchronously map cases 
near them. It is worth noting that, despite these misconceptions, 
such findings imply that COVID-19 may be, for some, becoming a 
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stigmatized disease. Future research will explore the potential stig-
matization of COVID-19 sufferers in more depth and over time. The 
main implication of relevance to the present study is that the public 
may not be adequately informed as to what contact tracing apps en-
tail. Improved communication regarding the purpose and nature of 
contact tracing apps may lead to increased use of the app.
Decision making was heavily influenced by moral reasoning. 
Those who said they would not download the app were motivated 
primarily by their moral opposition to the use of such technologies 
as an infringement of individual civil liberties. This can be seen as 
an example of the liberal objection to public health intervention,26 
as seen previously in debates over smoking bans,27 electronic cig-
arettes28 and sugar taxes.29 By contrast, amongst those who were 
intending on using the app, decision making was driven by a more 
utilitarian evaluation of the relative costs and benefits.30 Many 
shared the same concerns as those who did not intend to use the 
app, but deemed that the potential life lost from COVID-19 out-
weighed any privacy infringements. In a sense, their construction of 
the app as being for ‘the greater good’ serves as rejoinder, based on 
Mill's harm principle,31 to the liberal objection that using the app is a 
personal choice (since by not using it, one can, indirectly harm others 
by contributing to the spread of the virus).In some cases, reluctant 
willingness to use the app was framed in altruistic terms, as a per-
sonal sacrifice of one's privacy, whereas in other cases it was framed 
more in terms of enlightened egoism,32 that is, as a means of pro-
tecting the vulnerable while also getting themselves ‘out of this’ pan-
demic. For those who stated they would use the app, the decision 
was arguably one high in ‘moral intensity’, because of the temporal 
immediacy of the pandemic (its rapid spread), the magnitude of its 
consequences (its high death rates) and its concentration of effect 
(ie severe impacts (serious illness and death) amongst a relatively 
small number of people being greater than modest impacts (privacy 
risks) amongst a much larger number of people (total app users)).33 
Finally, those who were undecided were generally still in the process 
of a utilitarian evaluation of the perceived costs and benefits of the 
contact tracing app. In order to achieve initial and ongoing use of 
contact tracing apps that are high enough to be effective,9 it will be 
important to obtain the support of those who are as yet undecided 
as to whether such apps are an effective and ethical public health 
intervention.
It is worth mentioning that a novelty of the methodology of this 
study is the fact that online focus groups were rendered necessary 
due to the fact that in-person focus groups were not permitted as 
a result of the UK social distancing policy. As such, this provides an 
early example of the potential feasibility of conducting qualitative 
research during a pandemic. It is likely that currently, and for at least 
the immediate future, much qualitative research will need to be con-
ducted via platforms such as Zoom. Future publications, building on 
our longitudinal design, will explore in greater depth the implications 
of virtual data collection during the pandemic, but a couple of early 
reflections warrant discussion here. Firstly, participant recruitment 
might have been impacted by the fact that far more social interac-
tion was occurring online due to the pandemic. For instance, some 
potential participants might have been deterred from participating 
because they were already engaging in numerous videoconfer-
ences and were reluctant to add more to their schedules (a number 
of participants in our study mentioned feeling as though they were 
spending excessive time online (and suffering from so-called ‘Zoom 
fatigue’). Secondly, although online focus groups were used in this 
particular study as a means for data collection, discussions revealed 
how for some participants, particularly those who lived alone, the 
focus groups themselves served as a source of social contact at a 
time when many in society were feeling isolated.4 Participants re-
flections of the experience of taking part in the focus groups them-
selves will be discussed in more detail in future publications.
4.1 | Limitations
A limitation of this study is its sample size, which is small in relation 
to large quantitative surveys,16 and thus does not permit our findings 
to be readily generalized to the UK population as a whole. This, how-
ever, is a limitation inherent to all qualitative research and not spe-
cifically to the current study. The main contribution of this study is 
its ability to shed light on the underlying reasons and beliefs that ac-
count for people's views on the app and which ultimately shape their 
decision of whether or not to use it. This study is also limited insofar 
as it did not recruit participants from ‘clinically extremely vulnerable’ 
categories.34 The terms ‘clinically vulnerable and clinically extremely 
vulnerable’ are official terms used by the UK’s NHS and denote those 
groups deemed at ‘moderate risk’ and ‘high risk’, respectively, with 
high risk groups including those who have a serious heart condition 
or who are undergoing certain treatments for cancer.34 Additionally, 
the study did not include any individuals aged 70 or older (also con-
sidered ‘clinically vulnerable’, although this was because we did not 
receive any responses from this age group, despite noting in our re-
cruitment material that applications from those considered clinically 
vulnerable were particularly encouraged. It is worth noting that using 
the term ‘vulnerable’ in our recruitment material may have dissuaded 
some participants from responding to our recruitment material, 
since, as has been argued, the term may be considered in some cases 
as derogatory or stigmatizing.35 Future research will look to specifi-
cally explore the attitudes of those classed as clinically extremely 
vulnerable(eg with specific health conditions) and clinically vulner-
able (eg over 70 years old) on COVID-19-related policy.
5  | CONCLUSIONS
Overall, findings suggest that many people are torn over whether 
digital contact tracing is a good idea or not, and concerns, particu-
larly over privacy and effectiveness play a significant role in their 
decision making. Several of our participants may have been insuf-
ficiently informed about the specific details of what digital contact 
tracing entails. Interestingly, our findings suggest that some people 
may be actively avoiding news coverage on coronavirus (as a result 
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of over-exposure to COVID-19 coverage and/or as a coping or avoid-
ance strategy). Indeed, limiting watching news coverage on COVID-19 
has been recommended as a means to protect mental health during 
the pandemic.36 As such, authorities must explore a range of methods 
and media to communicate the purpose and nature of contact tracing 
apps, including but not limited to, social media ads, postal information, 
text messaging and other emergency alert systems.
Public health authorities need to explore ways to better commu-
nicate or emphasize that the app cannot enable the user to identify 
which of their contacts has reported COVID-19 symptoms or tested 
positive, and that confidentiality is protected (since, at time of data 
collection this was not clear to most participants).Due to the longitu-
dinal nature of the research, future papers will explore participants’ 
actual use or non-use of the app. In order to for uptake to be high, 
normative beliefs will need to reflect the potential effectiveness and 
popularity of the app. In this way, public health messages could be 
similar to those employed in the effort to encourage widespread ad-
herence to social distancing guidelines, including campaigns around 
collective responsibility and the ‘greater good’. In engaging with the 
public, government and health agencies should also take into con-
sider the range of ethical orientations through which people are 
forming their views, something that may also prove useful in under-
standing public attitudes to other COVID-19 policies such as testing, 
self-isolation and particularly vaccines. The COVID-19 pandemic is 
a fundamentally global public health issue. As such, policymakers 
need to communicate to, and engage with, publics in ways which 
critically explore the interdependence of individual and population 
risk-taking and how self and how, in the context of global public 
health, self-interest and altruism can often converge.37
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